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Abstract
The Queensland Court of Appeal's decision to overturn a District Court
judge's decision to permanently stay criminal charges because of adverse
publicity against a· man accused of child sex offences has again
highlighted the importance of the right of an accused to a fair trial.
Australian courts have traditionally accorded the fair trial principle
primacy over other considerations. l Fairness is not a selective concept; it
applies to the accused as much as it does to the prosecution, for the public
has an interest in ensuring not only that justice is done but that it is done
fairly. However, there does not appear to be any definition by the courts
of how much or what type of prejudicial publicity will lead to a
pennanent stay of proceedings.
Introduction
It has long been recognised that Australian courts have the power to stay
an indictment permanently on the grounds of prejudicial publicity
rendering a fair trial at any time to be impossible. But apart from the
unique case of Tuckiar v The King2 there has been no instance in the
judicial history of Australia of an accused's conviction being quashed and
a verdict of acquittal entered on the grounds of prejudicial publicity. 3
While there is ample case law to suggest courts have acknowledged the
possibility that media publicity may create a situation in which an accused
will not be able to have a fair trial, the exceptional case has yet to arrive.
Last year, as a result of a Queensland judge's ruling, there was a prospect
a second case would join Tuckiar in Australian legal history.4 District
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1 Jago v The District Court o/New South Wales (1989) 168 CLR 23,56-7 (Deane J)
2 (1934) 52 CLR 335.
3 There is one other instance of a superior court granting a pennanent stay on the grounds
of prejudicial publicity Glennon v R (Unreported Court of Criminal Appeal Victoria,
McGarvie and Nathan JJ; Southwell J dissenting 1990) however, the decision was
subsequently overturned by the High Court R v Glennon (1992) 106 ALR 177.
4 R v Ferguson (2008) QDC 136 (Botting J, unreported).
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Court Judge Hugh Botting ruled that a notorious sex offender, Dennis
Raymond Ferguson, would have charges against him permanently stayed
because of a combination of pre-trial publicity and a weak prosecution
case. It would be no exaggeration to describe the damaging type of
prejudicial publicity that attended Ferguson before and after the trial as
unprecedented in recent Queensland and possibly Australian legal history.
However, within six weeks of Judge Botting's ruling the permanent stay
was overturned by the Queensland Court of Appeal. 5 The quick decision
was the result of a statement by the Chief Justice Paul de Jersey that the
Supreme Court of Queensland dealt with matters of major public concern
in a timely manner and would expedite the appeal process. 6 Given
relevant case law, however, the Queensland Court of Appeal's decision
was not surprising. There is no doubt that in Australia the bar is set
exceedingly high for an application for a permanent stay of proceedings
based on prejudicial publicity either pre-trial or in-trial. But also given the
fact that Australian courts do recognise the possibility that media
publicity may create a situation in which an accused will not be able to
have a fair trial the question must be asked; when, if ever, will prejudicial
media publicity lead a superior court to confidently permanently stay a
trial on these grounds?
Tuckiar's case
The history of Tuckiar's trial was set out in the joint reasons of his appeal
to the High Court heard by five justices. 7
Tuckiar was a Yolgnu man convicted of the murder of a white policeman
named Albert McColl. The only evidence against him at his trial was of
confessions which he was alleged to have made. One was to another
Yolgnu man, Parriner, and the other to an Aboriginal boy named Harry.
Tuckiar spoke no English and the evidence was given through an
interpreter who relayed it to the court in pidgin. Tuckiar was alleged to
have told Parriner that he (Tuckiar) had hidden in the bushes and given a
signal to a woman (described as one of "Tuckiar's women") handcuffed
to Constable McColl to move away and that when she did so he had
speared him. Harry's evidence was that Tuckiar said he had seen
Constable McColl having sexual intercourse with his wife and that, after
5 R v Ferguson; ex parte A-G (Qld) (2008) QCA 227
6 Jason Gregory, Robyn Ironside & Rosemary Odgers, 'Dennis Ferguson appeal to be fast-
tracked' The Courier-Mail, 2 July 2008
7 R v Tuckiar (1934) 52 CLR 335
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this, McColl had seen Tuckiar and fired at him. It was in this context that
Tuckiar had thrown the spear.
The Protector of Aborigines arranged for counsel to appear for Tuckiar.
At the conclusion ofParriner's evidence, the judge asked counsel in front
of the jury whether he had obtained instructions from Tuckiar about what
Parriner had to say. Counsel said that he had not. The judge adjourned the
trial so that counsel could speak with Tuckiar. On the resumption of the
trial, counsel asked if he could speak with the judge in chambers. There
followed a further adjournment during which counsel and the Protector of
Aborigines conferred with the judge in chambers. The trial resumed. No
evidence was called on Tuckiar's behalf.
The jury was troubled by the lack of evidence and they sent a note asking,
"if we are satisfied that there is not enough evidence, what is our
position?" The judge answered their question, saying among other things,
that they should not be swayed if they thought the Crown had not done its
duty, he reminded them that if they brought in a verdict of not guilty
Tuckiar would be freed and could not be tried again no matter what
evidence may be discovered in the future.
In his summing up the judge told the jury, "you have before you two
different stories, one of which sounds highly probable, and fits in with all
the known facts, and the other is so utterly ridiculous as to be an obvious
fabrication". He went on to comment that Tuckiar had not given evidence
and that the jury could draw any inference that they cared to draw from
that circumstance. Tuckiar was convicted and sentenced to death. After
the jury returned their verdict, Tuckiar's counsel informed the Court that
he had spoken with Tuckiar putting to hilTI that he had told two different
stories and asking him which one was tnle. Tuckiar had said that the true
account was the one he had told Parriner.
Tuckiar appealed to the High Court. The case was heard by five justices.
Their honours observed that for Inore than one reason the verdict could
not stand. In the ordinary course one would have expected the Court to
order a new trial. However, the publicity given to the statement made by
Tuckiar's counsel had been widespread throughout the Northern Territory
and in the extraordinary circumstances of the case it was considered that
it would not be possible to afford Tuckiar a fair trial. The Court directed
that a verdict and judgment of acquittal be entered. This was a landmark
decision in Australian criminal law as it represented the first instance of
an accused's conviction being quashed, and a verdict of acquittal being
66 The University of Tasmania Law Review Vol 28 No 1 2009
entered, on account of the potential prejudicial effect of pre-trial
publicity.
Facts in Ferguson's case
Ferguson had been convicted of many offences against children. Between
1998 and 2003 he was imprisoned for such offences. On 10 November
2005 he was arrested and charged with three further offences. On 31
March 2008, two of the three new charges against Ferguson were tried in
the District Court. One count was of indecent treatment of a child,
referred to as K, and one count was of indecent treatment of a child
referred to as B. At the conclusion of the Crown case, the trial judge ruled
that there was no evidence to support the second count. The Crown
prosecutor entered a nolle prosequi and the respondent was discharged in
relation to that count. The jury were then discharged, with Ferguson
remaining in custody pending his retrial on the count concerning the child
K.
A few days before the retrial, set down to start before a different judge in
early July 2008, Ferguson applied for a permanent stay of the proceedings
against him. This application was advanced on two bases: first, pre-trial
publicity meant that he could not receive a fair trial; and, secondly, the
Crown case was very weak. ·'The weakness of the case against Ferguson
related to the real possibility that the child victim was mistaken as to the
identification of the offender. That application was upheld by the primary
judge who made an order permanently staying the prosecution of this
count. (Ferguson originally applied for a permanent stay of the charges in
August 2007 but his application was dismissed by another judge).
Judge Botting, in his judgment, referred to a widespread, so-called
"debate" about Ferguson which started before his release from prison in
2003 and which has continued to this day.8 For example, widespread
reporting of:
• the fact of his numerous convictions of and imprisonment for
sexual offences committed against children;
• unattributed reports of his expressing an intention to have sex
with children upon his release from prison; and
• expressions of opinion, usually to the effect that the accused
should not be at large in the community or would constitute a
real risk to children ifallowed at large in the community.
8 R v Ferguson (2008) QDC 136, 4 (Botting J, unreported).
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Such opinions had reportedly been expressed by Ministers of the Crown,
Federal politicians, State politicians, City Councillors and by others who
might perhaps be described in the language of Brennan J in Glennon9 as:
'Persons who affect to convey the moral conscience of the community
and to possess information, insights and expertise in exceptional
measure'.
Of even greater significance was nightly coverage over a period of weeks
on national television news over a prolonged period of what can only be
described as 'lynch mobs' hounding Ferguson from various residences at
a number of Queensland connnunities including Murgon, Ipswich,
Mitchell and Carbrook where 24-hour police protection had reportedly
cost taxpayers more than $250,000. At one stage, the Government was
providing a Christian organisation with $1000 a day to house Ferguson
while he was awaiting trial. 10
In September 2008, Ipswich District Court ruled that Ferguson was
entitled to criminal compensation after a mob confronted him outside his
former home and threatened to kill him. 11 This resulted in Ferguson being
named no.18 in an Australian magazine's 50 'Most Hated people in
Australia' list. 12 The television footage of Ferguson invariably depicted
him lashing out at the media in a disturbed and demented fashion while
members of the public bayed abuse in the background. These images
were repeated on National television networks. As a result of this
publicity there would scarcely be a person in Queensland who would not
view Dennis Ferguson in a negative light.
In relation to the adverse effects of pre-trial publicity on the respondent's
prospects of a fair trial, his Honour conceded that in his experience most
jurors accept their duties responsibly, try to follow judicial directions
faithfully, and often will struggle hard to be entirely objective in their
assessment of the evidence. However, in the circumstances of the
Ferguson case, 'it was impossible to conceive that a jury could be
empanelled, all of whose members would be able to bring the
dispassionate judgment which the law requires to a consideration of the
evidence.' To pretend otherwise, he said, would in his opinion be
'disingenuous' . 13
9 The Queen v Glennon (1992) 173 CLR, 611.
10 'Accused paedophile wins compensation', The Australian, 20 September 2008,3
11 'Ferguson wins compo case', Townsville Bulletin, 20 September 2008,9
12 'Zoo Weekly's Top 50 People We Hate List', AAP 22 September 2008.
13 R v Ferguson (2008) QDC 136, 6-7 (Bottting J, unreported).
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An appeal was then launched by the Attorney-General against the order
pursuant to s 669A (IA) of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld).14
Court of Appeal's conclusions
In essence the Court of Appeal was critical of the trial judge for, in its
opinion, coming to a premature conclusion largely on the basis of, what it
described, as 'speculation'. 15 According to the QCA, s 47 of the Jury Act
(1995) afforded a better basis for reaching an informed view on the
prejudicial effect the pre-trial publicity would have on the jury. Section
47 is a special procedure where a judge, on application by a party in the
proceedings, may authorise the questioning of persons selected to serve as
jurors when the court reaches the final stage of the jury selection
process. 16 The purpose of the questioning is to find out whether the juror
can bring an impartial mind to bear on the issue. The effectiveness of this
remedy is debateable. Australian courts historically prefer judicial
instructions to juries to overcome the effects of prejudicial publicity
instead of allowing challenges for cause. 17
While there has been little research about the effectiveness of a voir dire
as a means of identifying prejudice 18 what research has been carrie.d out
in America suggests that jurors tend neither to speak out during voir dire
nor to admit to their true prejudices and preconceptions. 19 Jurors may
also be unaware of their prejudices. Another danger in questioning jurors
as to whether they have encountered publicity is likely to be that some
members of the jury may be reminded of the prejudicial publicity,
perhaps in manner suggesting that they ought to be prejudiced against the
accused.
Social influences may also cause a voir dire to be ineffective. For
instance, it is highly unlikely that someone will admit publicly to being a
bigot. There is also a risk that reluctant jurors will use confessions of
prejudice as a convenient method of avoiding jury duty. Therefore, a
14 For the purposes of this paper I shall only be referring to the pre-trial publicity finding.
15 R v Ferguson; ex parte A-G (Qld) (2008) QCA 227,22.
16 Jzoy Act (1995) s 47.
17 Les A. McCrimmon, 'Challenging a potential juror for cause: resuscitation or requiem?'
(2000) 23(1) UNSW La~'JournaI137.
18 Bronson E J, 'The Effectiveness of Voir Dire in Discovering Prejudice in High-
Publicity Cases: An Archival Study of the Minimization Effect' (1989) (paper prepared
for the 25th anniversary meeting of Law and Society Association noting lack of social
science literature on general effectiveness of voir dire).
19 See Broeder, 'Voir Dire examinations: An Empirical Study,' 38 South California Law
Review (1965), 503 and 528.
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challenge for cause does not overcome the problem posed in cases like
Ferguson's where there has been constant prejudicial coverage.
Delaying the start of a trial
The Court also criticised the judge for not adverting to an adjournment of
the trial for a few months as a remedy to defuse potential prejudice from
pre-trial publicity. The theory behind a delay is that jurors will be more
likely to forget the prejudice with the passage of time. The difficulty with
this measure, sometimes referred to as the 'fade factor'20 is judging how
much time is needed to dissipate the prejudice. In the United Kingdom
the 'fade factor' phenomena was first referred to in R v Reade, Morris &
Woodwiss (unreported) at the Central Criminal Court on 15 October
1993. In staying proceedings against three West Midlands Police officers,
Garland J took into account the adverse publicity generated, but
recognised that local prejudice may be temporary and may have an
element of 'fade factor'. But where prejudice becomes nationwide and
does not abate, he said, a stay may be appropriate.
For example, the start of the trial of the accused in the notorious Anita
Cobby murder was delayed for just· one week following media publicity
surrounding the earlier guilty plea of a co-accused. In that case the jury
was discharged on the grounds that the reference in the media to the
accused, Michael Murphy, as a prison escapee would result in unfair
prejudice to him. When a new jury was re-convened a week later an
application was made to adjourn the trial for a further six tTIonths
following another media reference to Murphy as a prison escapee. 21
Rejecting the application, Maxwell J said the trial would always attract
great publicity despite the effluxion of time and that the problem could be
overcome by adequate and repeated directions to the jury. In upholding
the judge's decision the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal said His Honour
had properly weighed the interests of the accused on one hand and the
public interest in the due administration of the criminal law on the other.
This view was subsequently shared by the High Court. 22 The decision
was made before the advent of the Internet therefore in view of the
20 Ex Parte B Central Criminal Court (Unreported, Scott-Baker J, 17 February 1994).
21 R v John Rayn10nd Travers; Michael James Murdoch; Leslie Joseph MZl1phy; Michael
Patrick Murphy; Gary Stephen Murphy (Unreported, Supreme Court of New South
Wales, Maxwell J,16 June 1987).
22 MZl1phy v The Queen and, Murdoch v The Queen and Murphy v The Queen (1989) 167
CLR 94.
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technological advances in communication since Murphy; Courts may be
placing too much reliance on the 'fade factor'.
For example, the Internet now affords easy access to information in the
form of web sites and blogs which often include unflattering details of an
accused, especially public figures, including prior convictions and other
prejudicial material. While there is a judicial presumption that prejudice
caused by publicity is only of a temporary nature, its volume, intensity
and continuing nature may produce a cumulative effect so that the
consequent prejudice is fuelled and continued. In Ferguson's case the
publicity was continuing and intense.
As recently as November 2008, news media were reporting on
community concern about Ferguson's whereabouts. 23 Under these
circumstances it is arguable that the presumption that the fade factor is
successful in allaying memories of prejudicial material is rebuttable. It is
also worth noting that a lapse of some two years in Hinch's24 case was
held to be insufficient to ameliorate the prejudicial effect of his
prejudicial broadcast. Therefore, it appears the durability of the prejudice
is the determinative issue for courts when deciding the length of delay in
starting proceedings. This is something of a 'case by case' test given there
does not appear to be any mathematical calculation that can be applied in
determining the length of time that will overcome different types of
prejudice. This is a highly unsatisfactory situation especially when an
accused's liberty is at stake.
Suppression orders
Suppression orders are of little effect in cases like Ferguson's because he
was the subject of considerable publicity before he was charged with his
latest alleged offence. In this situation the media are exempt from sub
judice restrictions and are at liberty to not only identify a suspect but also
to speculate on the suspect's character and alleged crimes. The media do,
of course, risk defamation proceedings should the suspect fail to be
charged or have charges dropped but this prospect does not appear to act
as an inhibiting mechanism for the tabloid press in particular. However,
what the prejudicial pre-trial publicity does is pre-empt an accused's right
to apply the court for a suppression order because once the accused's
identity is known a subsequent suppression order would be of little
benefit.
23 ABC Radio News, 'Deception Bay Community Meeting', Queensland, 26 November
2008, 7:03pm
24 Hinch v Attorney-General (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 1.
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Change of venue
Another remedy, a change of venue, referred to by the Court of Appeal in
Ferguson is also, arguably, of limited value in cases like Ferguson's. A
trial judge generally has power by statute to order a change of venue. 25
Ordinarily the place of trial is the jurisdiction within which an element of
the alleged crime takes place. 26 But while s 557(9) of the Queensland
Criminal Code permits a trial of a person with his or her consent in any
jurisdiction, this does not permit the defence, even with the acquiescence
or consent of the prosecution nominating a place of trial. Ordinarily, trials
will be heard in the district in which the alleged crime occurred. However
in, R v Yanner Pincus J said:
In some instances it may be relatively easy to obtain a change of venue - for
example where the charge is one of a grave crime, it appears that there is
considerable local hostility to the accused,. and there is a much better chance
ofjustice being done if the venue is changed. 27
These remarks however, were quoted by counsel, without success (at
least initially) in support of an application for a change of venue in
Long's28 case where, by any analysis, a grave crime existed.29
Eventually, following an appeal to the Supreme Court, the Queensland
Court of Appeal, and an application for special leave to appeal to the
High Court, the Chief Justice intervened, this time acceding to the
original submission that Long's trial take place in Brisbane.
The reluctance of Australian courts to change venue seems to be echoed
in the United States where it was noted that even in the case of Jack
Ruby, where by the time of trial every citizen of Dallas might have been
expected to have seen the television film clip of Ruby shooting Lee
Harvey Oswald, the trial judge refused to grant a motion for a change of
venue. 30 One recent exception was US v McVeigh,31 the Oklahoma
bombing trial, in which the venue was changed to Denver. Explaining his
decision to move the trial, Judge Matsch said extensive publicity before
trial did not, in itself, preclude fairness because properly motivated and
25 See e.g. Supreme Court Act (Qld) s 223.
26 Criminal Code (Qld), s557; also R v Giddings [1916] VLR 359.
27 [1998] 2 Qd R.
28 R v Long: ex parte A-G (Qld) (2003) QCA 77
29 Long was charged with and subsequently convicted of the murder of two of the 15
people who died in the notorious Childers Backpacker's hostel fire in June 2000.
30 Belli, M, My Life on Trial (1976), 260-261.
31 US v McVeigh, 918 F Supp 1467 (1996).
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carefully instructed jurors can and have exercised discipline to disregard
prior awareness of publicity. However, he went on to say that:
Trust in their ability to do so diminishes when the prior exposure is such
that it evokes strong emotional responses or such identification with those
directly affected by the conduct at issue that the jurors feel a personal stake
in the outcome. That is also true when there is such identification with a
community point of view that jurors feel a sense of obligation to reach a
result which will find general acceptance in the relevant audience. 32
The media pre-trial exposure in Ferguson's case would create something
of a parallel with the McVeigh case. As detailed above, the emotional
response invoked was of a highly prejudicial nature. Also, as noted
above, developments in technology, especially the Internet, mean that
changes of venue may no longer work in the way they once did. The ease
of accessibility of information on the Internet, which may include details
of prior convictions and other conduct about the accused, could largely
render a change of venue futile. Also, a change of venue may be of value
if the risk of prejudice has predominantly been caused by local publicity,
but if the prejudicial publicity is national, as in Ferguson's case, there is
no other neutral venue available.
Trial by Judge alone
Another remedy for cases where the level of prejudicial material is so
strong that it cannot be overcome by a judge's instructions to the jury, is
trial by judge alone. The rationale is that a legally trained judge would be
less likely to be swayed by prejudice generated by the media. Last year
Queensland joined some other jurisdictions33 in making provision for this
remedy by amending the Criminal Code (Qld).34 This remedy is only
available with the accused's consent. 35 However some trial judges have
expressed concern about the idea that the trial of a major indictable
offence may take place without a jury. 36
In R v Marshall, the first murder trial in Australia to be conducted by a
judge alone, the trial judge expressed misgivings about shifting many
important value judgments from jury to judge. 37 Indeed he felt so
32U.s. v McVeigh, 918 F.Supp. 1473 (1996)
33 NSW Criminal Procedure Act, (1986), s32, s33; Western Australia Criminal Code, Ch
LXIVA; ACT Supreme Court Act (1933), Pt VII; South Australian Juries Act, s7.
34 The Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) Chapter division 9A Trial by judge alone.
35 The Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) S 615.
36 R v Marshall (1986) 22 A Crim R 432.
37 R v Marshall (1986) 22 A Crim R 479.
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strongly about it he recommended that the South Australian Juries Act be
amended so as to exclude trial by judge alone in trials for treason and
murder. 38 In his judgment, White J said that while there may be value in
opting for trial by judge alone in complicated fraud and commercial
cases, even judges would have difficulty in putting to one side, in a case
as serious as murder, the kind of prejudicial material which is often
introduced into a voir dire. 39 Furthermore, he said, the values of the
community are so deeply involved in the many value-judgments which
have to be made in the course of a trial that a trial without a jury on a
charge of murder would be in danger of becoming a quite different legal
process than it has been traditionally. 40 There is also the dictum of Deane
J in Brown v The Queen:
[T]he deep seated conviction of free men and women about the way in
which justice should be administered in criminal cases, namely that,
regardless of the position of the particular alleged offender, guilt or
innocence of a serious offence should be determined by a panel of ordinary
and anonymous citizens, assembled as representative of the general
community at whose hands neither the powerful nor the weak should expect
or fear special or discriminatory treatment. 41
Nevertheless Ferguson made application and was granted an order for a
trial by a judge sitting alone42 which defence counsel obviously preferred
given the apparent weakness of the prosecution's case against him. It
proved successful. After a three day hearing in the District Court at
Brisbane Ferguson was found not guilty of one count of indecent
treatment of a child under 16 years with a circumstance of aggravation.43
To what extent the tactical decision, to put Ferguson in front of a Judge
sitting alone rather than a jury, proved decisive is impossible to know but
it is certainly a development that will not have escaped the notice of
lawyers defending unpopular clients in the future.
Judicial instructions
The Court of Appeal also referred to judicial instructions to the jury as a
further safeguard to a fair trial. Judges regularly instruct jurors to ignore
prejudicial publicity while they are deliberating on a case. The warning
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid 480.
40 Ibid 482.
41 Brown v The Queen (1986) 160 CLR 269.
42 Pursuant to the order of Robin QC DCl on 23 February 2009; Criminal Code, Chapter
division 9A; Tony Keirn, 'No jury for Ferguson - Judge to decide on sex abuse' The
Courier-Mail 24 February 2009 p. 4
43 R v Dennis Raymond Ferguson [2009] QDC 049 Wolfe CJDC 6 March 2009.
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usually refers to matter published before the trial as well as during the
trial. It usually takes the effect of the judge instructing the jury to decide
according to the evidence put before them and the law alone and to put all
other considerations out of their minds. There is no conclusive evidence
as to how satisfactory this measure is. This has been acknowledged in the
High Court in Gilbert v The Queen44 by Gleeson CJ and Gummow J who
said that while the system of criminal justice requires the assumption that
juries follow and understand directions given by the trial judge it does not
involve the assumption that their decision-making is unaffected by
possible prejudice. According to a New South Wales report,45 the
instruction, especially concerning in-trial publicity, is often ineffective, at
least in relation to newspaper coverage of the trial. While some jurors
obey it, others do not.
Furthermore the Australian Law Reform Commission's report on
Contempt46 refers to a newspaper report of a jury's deliberations on a
case, that when told their case had been discussed in the press and that
they should ignore the press reports, their response was to make a special
effort to find out what had been said in the press and to discuss its
significance among themselves. In earlier times it could be assumed
judges in their admonitions were referring to television and newspaper
reports. Over the past decade the Internet has provided easy access to
news events and information about a defendant's prior criminal record.
For example, there is a dedicated site known as CrimeNet47 in which, for
a small fee, one is able to access a person's prior criminal record and
other details. This site has led to one judge in Victoria discharging a jury
after it was revealed the jury may have had access to the accused's prior
criminal record.48 Retrials were ordered in New South Wales after jurors
became aware via the Internet of the accused's criminal history49 and
after two jurors conducted their own inspection of the site of the rape
offence being tried. 50 It is also a problem for the courts because courts
now, almost automatically, publish on their own websites or through
services such as austlii.edu.au. In one case the issue arose because a jury
44 Gilbert v The Queen (2000) HCA 15.
45 Chesterman M, Chan J and Hampson S, Managing Prejudicial Publicity: An empirical
study ofcrin1inaljury trials in New South Wales (2001) 207.
46 Australian Law Reform Commission, Contempt, Report No 35 (1987), [163].
47 http://www.crimenet.com.au.
48 R v McLachlan [2000] VSC 215; R v Cogley [2000] VSCA 231 was similarly a case
involving an application to discharge a jury when concerns arose as to whether one or
more members of the jury may have seen an entry on the Crime Net Internet site.
49 R v K [2003] NSWCCA 406.
50 R v Skaf[2004] NSWCCA 37.
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could, theoretically, access rulings made by the court, and posted on the
court website, during the course of a second trial. These rulings remained
accessible by jurors sitting in the second trial. 51
A television broadcast or a newspaper article may appear only briefly and
then is relegated to archives that often not only require substantial effort
to research but also can require significant payment. In contrast, Internet
sites easily retain. accessible information allowing a prospective or actual
juror to retrieve it at will. It is not clear whether or not juries should be
directed not to access the Internet, as this may encourage some to secretly
do so. In Queensland, by 69A of the Jury Act 1995, a juror would commit
an offence if he or she were to make inquiries about the defendant in the
trial. The word 'inquire' is specifically defined to include searching an
electronic database. In 2008, the Victorian Parliament amended the Juries
Act 2000 (Vic) creating the offence of a juror or jury panel member
making an inquiry 'about a party to the trial or any matter relevant to the
trial'. Also, as a result of the decisions in R v K52 and R v Skaf,53 the
New South Wales Parliament introduced amendments to the Jury Act
1977 making it an offence for jurors to conduct their own investigations
concerning a trial. 54
Judicial instructions have also been criticised in American jurisdictions.
Justice Learned Hand described instructions telling the jury to ignore
information learned outside the court as a 'placebo'55 requiring of a jury 'a
mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only their powers but anybody's
else [sic]'.56 Another American judge put the issue more bluntly, .'the
naIve assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions
to the jury all practising lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction'. 57
Nevertheless most judges in Australia consider that directions to a jury to
ignore prejudicial publicity remain an effective remedy. 58 This is despite
there being no credible study that indicates that judicial instructions limit
the effects of prejudicial media bias.
51 DPP v Weiss [2002] VSC 153.
52 R v K [2003] NSWCCA 406.
53 R v Skaj'[2004] NSWCCA 37.
54 Jury Act 1977 (NSW) s 68C.
55 United States v Delli Paoli (1956) F.2d 319,321.
56 Nash v United States (1932) 54 F.2d 1006, 1007.
57 Krulevitch v US (1949) 336 US 440, 453
58 Chesterman, MChan J and Hampson, S Managing Prejudicial Publicity: An empirical
study of criminal jury trials in Nelt' South Wales (2001) 207; Les A. McCrimmon,
'Challenging a potential juror for cause: resuscitation or requiem?" (2000) 23 (1) UNSW
Law Journal 137.
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Indeed there is some doubt about the ability of jurors to understand,
remember, and apply the legal principles explained by the judge,
especially in fraud trials or where there are several defendants or a
multiplicity of counts. 59 As the author of a Victoria Law Reform report
into jury service put it:
For two to three hours he (the judge) reads to 12 laymen enough law to keep
a law student busy for a semester. Twelve individuals selected more or less
at random, sit there, unable to take notes or ask questions. Somehow, just by
listening, it is presumed everything spoken by the judge will take root in
their collective intelligence. 60
And, according to one authority 'the most serious problem that jurors
encounter in their efforts to get things right appears to be an inability to
apply instructions correctly'. 61 Much of the research undertaken on the
effect of a judge's instructions to jurors has been contradictory. Some
research indicates that jurors do respond as intended to instructions62
while others have found that instructions are often ignored. 63 In reality it
is difficult to assess whether judges directions effectively overcome the
adverse effect of the jury hearing prejudicial and inadmissible evidence
against an accused.
Therefore, in the absence of convincing evidence that jurors will not be
affected by prejudice, it is submitted the more prudent practice would be
for judges to err on the side of caution in cases that have attracted
prejudicial publicity and not simply rely on judicial instructions to jurors
to ignore the publicity.
59 James (Sir), A; 'What judges say to juries, from the point of view of juries and of the
Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)', eds., Walker, N and Pearson, A The British Jury
System; Papers presented to the Cropwood Round-Table Conference, University of
Cambridge Press, Cambridge, 1975,56-63.
60 Cowie, M, Victorian Law Refonn Commission, Jury Service in Victoria, Final Report,
Volume 3 (1997), [2.202].
61 Charrow R.P. and Charrow V.R., 'Making legal language understandable: a
psycholinguistic study ofjury instructions' , (1979) 79 Columbia Law Review 165.
62 NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, Juror understanding of judicial
instructions in criminal trials, September 2008; E. Borgida and R Park, 'The
Entrapment defence' (1988) 12 Law and Hun1an Behaviour 19; K.L. Pickel, 'Inducing
Jurors to Disregard Inadmissible Evidence: A Legal Explanation Does Not Help (1995)
19 Law and Human Behaviour 407.
63 S. Tanford and M. Cox, 'The Effects of Impeachment Evidence' (1988) 12 Law and
Human Behaviour 477.
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Permanent Stay of Proceedings
As noted above, there is a power to stay an indictment permanently on the
grounds that no direction from the trial judge could be expected to
diminish the impact of prejudicial publicity rendering a fair trial at any
time to be impossible. It has been recognized by the High Court in R v
Glennon64 and the Court of Appeal in Queensland in R v Lewis65 and R v
Long, 66 but apart from Tuckiar v R67 there has been no reported case in
Australia of an accused's conviction being quashed and a verdict of
acquittal then entered on the grounds of the potential prejudicial effect of
pre-trial publicity.
There has been speculation by some commentators however, that a
permanent stay of proceedings as a result of prejudicial pre trial publicity
may have been granted for the second time in Australian judicial history
had infamous Australian corporate fugitive, the late Christopher Skase,
been brought to trial in this country.68 Skase was the subject of enormous
prejudicial publicity in Australia during the 1990s while he was residing
in Spain fighting extradition. Certainly it could be said that Skase was a
person who needed no introduction to Australians in the most negative
sense imaginable due to the news media and successive Federal
governments' sustained campaign against him over the course of several
years. This then would have raised problems in selecting a jury who could
fairly be said to be impartial had his trial for criminal charges gone ahead.
It would have been almost certain that an application for a permanent stay
of proceedings would have been the first plank of any defence platform
mounted by his lawyers in the event of a trial in Australia. Had a
permanent stay of proceedings been granted, one could only imagine the
public and political outrage such a decision would have engendered.
Notwithstanding the separation of powers, the pressure that would be
brought to bear on the court responsible for such a decision is clear. This
again raises the question; could the subject of such prejudicial pre-trial
publicity ever be tried fairly? An English judge at Harrow Crown Court
answered this question in September 1995 69 where he ordered a stay of
64 (1992) 173 CLR 592.
65 (1992) 1 Qd R 613.
66 R v Long; ex parte A-G (Qld) (2003) QCA 77.
67 (1934) 52 CLR 335.
68 Giddings, J, 'Would Christopher Skase Receive a Fair Trial?' (2000) Criminal Law
Journal 24, 281
69 Corker D and Levi M, 'Pre-trial Publicity and its Treatment in the English Courts',
Criminal Law Review, (1996), 622
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the proceedings against a defendant Geoff Knights on the ground of
prejudice caused by pre-trial publicity alone. This is believed to be the
first case in the United Kingdom where prejudicial pre-trial publicity has
been the sole reason for abandoning a trial. Knights was the well-known
de facto husband of a 'soap' star, one Gillian Taylforth, and following his
arrest for the alleged assault and unlawful wounding upon Taylforth's
driver, some newspapers published hostile comments impugning his
character, including information about previous convictions and brushes
with he law which would have been inadmissible at trial. In this case the
Judge said during his ruling:
The reporting was unlawful, misleading and scandalous. Certain reporters
were determined to run a hate campaign against Knights unchecked by their
editors and without any regard to the interests of justice. I have absolutely
no doubt that the massive media publicity in this case was unfair,
outrageous and oppressive. 70
Although the Attorney-General failed in subsequent proceedings against
five newspapers for contempt of court resulting from the prejudicial
publicity this was due to the disadvantage any Attorney-General in the
UK has in bringing prosecutions under the Contempt of Court Act 1981.
The statutory test requires the Attorney to satisfy the court that a
particular article or broadcast itself (in isolation from any other media
report) has created a substantial risk of serious prejudice. As the Corker &
Levi article points out, in reality the risk of prejudice arises most
frequently from the cumulative or 'snowball' effect of publicity over a
period of time not from a single article or broadcast. 71 This is precisely
the situation Ferguson found himself in.
More recently the High Court of Fiji put a permanent stay on the trial of
businessman Ballu Khan accused of conspiring with nine others to
assassinate key members of the interim government in that country. 72
One of the grounds successfully argued to stay the proceedings against
Mr Khan was that pre-trial publicity about him was sufficiently
prejudicial to justify a stay; and two, the publicity was generated with the
purpose ofprejudicing his interests. 73
70 The Times, August 1, 1996.
71 Corker D and Levi M., 'Pre-trial Publicity and its Treatment in the English Courts",
(1996), Criminal Law Revielv, 627.
72 'Ballu Khan is now a free man', Fiji Broadcasting Corporation, 12 November 2008,
http://www.radiofiji.com.fj/print.php?id=15820
73 Ibid.
Prejudicial Publicity: When Will it Ever Result in a Permanent Stay of 79
Proceedings?
Special leave refused
Ferguson appealed to the High Court for special leave against the
Queensland Court of Appeal's decision not to permanently stay
proceedings but it was denied for grounds other that of the impact of
prejudicial publicity.74 Although the prejudicial publicity argument was
not put in oral argument it is highly likely that even if it had been it would
not have been successful. The last application to the High Court for a
permanent stay on the grounds of prejudicial publicity by the man
convicted of the Childers Backpacker murders Robert Paul Long did not
succeed. During the course of argument by Long's counsel, Gleeson CJ
said a judge 'should stop long and hard' before reaching the conclusion
that an accused could not get a fair trial as the result of prejudicial
publicity.75 The Chief Justice was firmly of the view that the giving of
appropriate warnings and directions to juries to decide the case according
to the evidence was sufficient to ensure a fair trial. 76 As a consequence
the special leave application was dismissed.
Conclusion
The presumption of innocence is a fundamental principle of the common
law and has been enshrined in international covenants. 77 The most
significant effect of the presumption is the requirement that the Crown
bear the burden of proving all elements of the charges but a logical
extension of it is an accused should suffer no detriment as a result of
being charged with an alleged crime. There does not appear any reason
why this principle should. be disturbed for some greater public interest.
This presumption of innocence was most certainly ignored concerning
Ferguson as a result of the 'trial by lnedia' that occurred before his case
had even been heard.
To come back to the original question: when will prejudicial media
publicity lead a superior court to confidently permanently stay a trial on
the grounds that no direction from a trial judge can be expected to
diminish its impact rendering a fair trial impossible?
The answer in Australia, at least, seelns to be almost never or not until a
truly exceptional case arrives. As argued above, the advent of the Internet
74 Ferguson v The Queen [2009] HCA transcript 16 (13 February 2009)
75 Long v The Queen [2004] HCA transcript 232 (23 June 2004).
76 Ibid.
77 "The golden thread": Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462, 481 (Sankey LC);
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art 14.
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and the media revolution generally, means the public, including
prospective jurors, receive far more information than was the case in the
1930's when Tuckiar's case was decided. It is interesting courts
acknowledge the dangers of prejudicial publicity concerning a fair trial
when trying the media for contempt of court but they are reluctant to take
the next step and order a permanent stay of proceedings because of the
same concerns.
However, although the 'truly exceptional case' is difficult to characterise
many would believe the Ferguson case would come within that category.
As noted above, the publicity attending Ferguson was constant and
prejudicial to the extent that is hard to conceive of more damaging
publicity concerning an accused.
Given these circumstances and the possibility of repeat episodes it is now
timely for superior courts or the Legislature to give a clear indication as
to when enough is enough as far as prejudicial material is concerned and
to develop guidelines that will avoid the disturbing spectacle that
preceded the trial of Dennis Raymond Ferguson.
